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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
The flexibility of attitudes and beliefs is both hindering and advantageous. 
Without flexible attitudes, movements that spurred great social change would have 
failed to correct societal inequalities that undermine human well-being by persuading 
individuals to alter their opinions. Yet, flexible attitudes have some vices. From Adolf 
Hitler to Jim Jones, the flexibility of their followers’ attitudes and beliefs allowed one 
individual with extreme intentions to lead great numbers of people to commit atrocities 
that shook social scientists’ understandings of human morality. 
Social psychologists are has examined both the “dark” and “light” sides of 
attitude stability and change (Ajzen & Fishbein, 1977; Schwarz, 2007; Lord & Lepper, 
1999). Though the flexibility of attitudes has paved the road to many of social 
psychology’s greatest findings in social influence and persuasion, attitude flexibility has 
a few less than desirable implications. Historically, the utility of attitudes, or evaluations, 
has been rooted in the ability of attitudes to predict behavior (Cohen, 1964; DeFleur & 
Westie, 1963). Attitudes have also been conceptualized as stable dispositions (Ajzen, 
1988, 1991; Campbell, 1950; 1963; Chein, 1948; Krech & Crutchfield, 1948). 
Unfortunately, attitudes have often been found to be less than useful as behavioral 
predictors (Campbell, 1963; Eagly & Chaiken, 1993; LaPiere, 1934; McGuire, 1985; 
Wicker, 1969; see Lord & Lepper, 1999 and Schwarz, 2007 for reviews), and often fail 
to be consistent across time (Asch, 1940) due to context effects (Schwarz, 2007) and 
social influence (Eagly & Chaiken, 1993; Festinger, 1950; for reviews see Crano & 
Prislin, 2006; Petty, Wegener, & Fabrigar,1997; Wood, 2000).  
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Many researchers have theorized that attitude flexibility is largely due to 
variations in the accessible attitude-relevant knowledge individuals use when forming an 
evaluation (Lord & Lepper, 1999; Schwarz, 2007), since attitude reports tend to be 
congruent when the information available is consistent at different time periods (Lord & 
Lepper, 1999; Lord, Paulson, Sia, Thomas, & Lepper, 2004; Schwarz & Bohner, 2001). 
According to this construal-based perspective, the key to getting individuals to have 
stable, behaviorally-predictive evaluations is to increase the likelihood that they will 
retrieve consistent representations of attitude-objects prior to evaluative responding 
(Lord & Lepper, 1999). In the present research, a method of making evaluations more 
consistent across time has been proposed. Having individuals draw concept maps to 
structure and deliberate their knowledge has been established as an effective way to 
aid in the storage and retrieval of information (e.g. Amer, 1994; Blankenship & 
Dansereau, 2000; Hall & O’Donnell, 1996; Lambiotte, Dansereau, Cross, & Reynolds, 
1989; Nesbit & Adesope, 2005; 2006; Patterson, Dansereau, & Newbern, 1992), and 
therefore may aid in making accessible attitude-representations more consistent across 
time. The purpose of the proposed research is to demonstrate that having individuals 
deliberate their attitude-relevant knowledge via concept mapping will serve to buffer 
against evaluative flexibility, even in the face of an attitude change manipulation.  
Stable and Unstable Evaluations 
Though many social psychologists have conceptualized attitudes as enduring 
dispositions (e.g. Ajzen, 1988, 1991; Campbell, 1950; 1963; Chein, 1948; See Eagly & 
Chaiken, 1993 for a review; Krech & Crutchfield, 1948), a wealth of research suggests 
this is not so. Evaluative responses can be rendered inconsistent by many means, such 
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as continual exposure to a stimulus (Abrams & Greenwald, 2000; Bornstein, 1989; 
Harmon-Jones & Allen, 2001; Moreland & Zajonc, 1982), evaluative conditioning (See 
De Houwer, Thomas, & Baeyens, 2001 for a review; Levey & Martin, 1975), subliminal 
priming (e.g. Han, Olson, & Fazio, 2006), extrapersonal associations (Olson & Fazio, 
2004), changing the accessible mental representations one has of an attitude object 
(Bless, Schwarz, & Wänke, 2003; Lord & Lepper, 1999; Lord, Paulson, Sia, Thomas, & 
Lepper, 2004; Schwarz & Bless, 2007; Sia, Lord, Blessum, Ratcliff, & Lepper, 1997; 
Schwarz, 1999; Tourangeau, 1992), knowing others have different attitudes (Asch, 
1940; Ledgerwood, Trope, & Chaiken, 2010; McGuire, 1969), temporal construal 
(Ledgerwood, Trope, & Chaiken, 2010), and the context of nearby questions in self-
report measures (e.g., Schwarz, 1999; Tourangeau, 1992), among others. If attitudes 
are so often discrepant, is it even useful to consider them as enduring states or 
dispositions? Many theorists argue that attitudes are spontaneously constructed 
whenever an attitude object is encountered (Bassili & Brown, 2005; Lord & Lepper, 
1999; Schwarz, 2007; Schwarz & Bohner, 2001; Smith & DeCoster, 2000; Tourangeau, 
1992; Wilson & Hodges, 1992; Zaller, 1992). To these theorists, attitudes are no longer 
conceptualized as enduring dispositions (Ajzen, 1988, 1991; Campbell, 1950; 1963; 
Chein, 1948; Krech & Crutchfield, 1948) or “files” that are retrieved from memory 
(Wilson & Hodges, 1992). In this case, when attitudes are considered to be “stable,” 
individuals are providing relatively consistent attitude constructions across time 
(Schwarz, 2007). 
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Attitude Relevant Knowledge 
One reason individuals may report consistent attitudes is that accessible 
information relevant to the attitude object is also consistently activated across time (Lord 
& Lepper, 1999). These activated representations can explain a wide variety of the 
context effects that occur with evaluative responses since attitudes are an outcome of 
the evaluative processes that use a limited amount of information available in memory 
and one’s environment (Lord & Lepper, 1999; Schwarz & Bohner, 2001; Wilson & 
Hodges, 1992). Accordingly, many theorists hold that attitudes are a function of the 
knowledge and mental representations one has of an attitude object (e.g. Ajzen & 
Sexton, 1999; Ajzen & Fishbein, 1977; Anderson, 1971; Bassili & Brown, 2005; 
Chaiken, Duckworth, & Darke, 1999; Conrey & Smith, 2007; Fazio, 1990, 1995, 2007; 
Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975; Ledgerwood, Trope, & Liberman, 2010; Lord & Lepper, 1999; 
Schwarz & Bohner, 2001; Wilson & Hodges, 1992). This information that is used in 
evaluative processing is often referred to as “attitude-relevant knowledge” (e.g. Barden 
& Petty, 2008; Clark, Wegener, & Fabrigar, 2008; Fabrigar, Petty, Smith, & Crites, 2006; 
Holbrook, Berent, Krosnick, Visser, & Boninger, 2005; Wood, Rhodes, & Biek, 1995). 
Although there is great consensus that attitude-relevant knowledge is involved in 
attitude construction, there is little consensus in exactly how attitude-relevant knowledge 
is conceptualized as coming together to render a judgment. Some models identify a 
single, unitary process in which information comes together to form a judgment (e.g. 
Anderson, 1971; Fazio, 1995; Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975; Lord & Lepper, 1999), while 
others offer more than one (e.g. Dual-process models such as those developed by 
Chaiken, 1980, 1987; Petty & Cacioppo, 1986).  
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Both the heuristic-systematic model (Chaiken, 1980, 1987; Chaiken, Liberman, & 
Eagly, 1989) and the elaboration-likelihood model (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986) are 
examples of dual-process models of attitude formation and change. Both models 
conceptualize attitude construction and change as a function of either highly effortful 
cognitive processing or cognitive processing that is not effortful. The Elaboration 
likelihood model maintains that central, or effortful, processing involves a careful 
scrutiny of attitude-relevant information, whereas peripheral (low effort) processing uses 
trivial information such as message-length, source expertise, and source-attractiveness, 
among others (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986). According to Petty and Cacioppo (1986), the 
motivation and ability to process persuasive attempts predicts what information 
processing route will be used to render a judgment. Similarly, the heuristic-systematic 
model distinguishes between thorough, analytic processing of information (systematic 
processing) and limited information processing utilizing simple decision-making rules or 
heuristic processing (Chaiken, Liberman, & Eagly, 1989). 
Single-process models of attitude-relevant processing generally focus more on 
the structure and integration of attitude-relevant knowledge than the mode of attitude-
relevant information processing. For instance, both the expectancy-value model 
(Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975) and Attitude Representation Theory (Lord & Lepper, 1999) 
posit that evaluations are an additive combination of the valence of attitude-relevant 
knowledge. Similarly, Information Integration Theory (Anderson, 1971, 1981) holds that 
pieces of salient attitude-relevant information are weighted by their perceived 
importance and combined to form a judgment.  
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Other models tie in systems of how evaluative information is stored and 
processed. Expanding upon Fazio’s MODE model of attitudes (1990, 1995, 2007), 
which views the attitude as a link between an attitude-object and an evaluation, 
Wegener and Carlston (2005) describe attitude-relevant knowledge as existing in an 
associative network, with pieces of attitude-relevant information being other nodes that 
are linked to this connection. Bassili and Brown’s (2005) Potentiated Recruitment Model 
maintains that evaluations are a function of microconcepts, or molecular units of 
attitude-relevant knowledge, that are activated from a representational network. Bassili 
and Brown identify several sources that activate attitude microconcepts: priming, 
eliciting conditions such as encountering attitude objects, spreading activation, and 
activity in working memory. Conrey & Smith’s (2007) connectionist model of attitude 
representation and construction makes very similar claims to the Potentiated 
Recruitment Model, but differs in explaining how the construction of implicit evaluative 
responses occurs. Both models view explicit, self-reported attitudes as a function of the 
accessible representations in working memory. However, Bassili and Brown (2005) 
argue that implicit evaluations are not a function of accessible representations, whereas 
Conrey & Smith (2007) posit that individuals are conscious of their implicit evaluations, 
indicating working memory is important for implicit evaluations. Regardless of the 
method in which evaluative information is stored, retrieved, and used to render an 
evaluation, it is clear that attitude-relevant knowledge is one of the most important 
factors in determining attitudes and behavioral consistency (Lord & Lepper, 1999). 
Having established the importance of attitude-relevant knowledge, the following 
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sections will explore the role that attitude-relevant knowledge plays in both the 
behavioral-predictability and evaluative consistency of attitude reports. 
Attitude-Relevant Knowledge and Attitude-Behavior Consistency 
In addition to recognizing the extensive role of attitude-relevant knowledge in 
evaluative judgments, attitude theorists recognize that some attitudes have more 
“strength” than others. Strong attitudes persistent across time, are resistant to change, 
have a strong impact on behavior, and strongly impact information processing (Krosnick 
& Petty, 1995). Because strong attitudes affect information-processing, attitude stability 
and attitude-behavioral consistency should be associated with greater attitude-relevant 
thinking. Attitude strength has been assessed using several dimensions: certainty of 
one’s attitudes, higher levels of perceived attitude-relevant knowledge, more accessible 
attitudes, perceiving the attitude object as important and personally-relevant, and more 
extreme attitude reports, among others (Krosnick, Boninger, Yao, Berent, & Carnot, 
1993; Krosnick & Petty, 1995).  
In the context of the potentiated recruitment framework (Bassili & Brown, 2005; 
Bassili, 2008) attitude strength is viewed as an increased fluidity of attitude-relevant 
knowledge potentiation. Attitudes that are stronger and subsequently more stable are 
theorized to be a function of groups of interconnected attitude-relevant microconcepts 
(Bassili, 2008). Because these microconcepts are interconnected, they are likely to be 
consistently activated together, leading to activated attitude representations that are 
relatively consistent across time. In turn, these consistent attitude representations lead 
to consistent evaluative responses, since they are more likely to be potentiated than 
other representations. Additionally, due to their fluidity, these attitude relevant 
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representations will be more accessible, meaning that the attitude-relevant knowledge is 
elicited more quickly, leading to quicker evaluative judgments. Most importantly, 
because these micro-concepts are likely to be recruited consistently, leading to 
consistent evaluations, it is more likely that these evaluations will affect behavior 
consistently, leading to greater correspondence between attitude reports and behaviors. 
In addition to the literature on attitude strength and attitude-behavior consistency, 
one body of research has established that greater amounts of attitude-relevant thinking 
lead to increased attitude-behavioral consistency. Both Kallgren and Wood (1986) and 
Davidson, Yantis, Norwood, and Montano (1985) found that the amount of information 
participants listed about attitude objects was positively associated with how predictive 
participants’ reported attitudes were of behaviors. Welker, McIntyre, Oberleitner, Lin, 
and Lord (2012) had participants create attitude concept-maps to increase the amount 
of attitude-relevant thinking participants engaged in. Participants that designed more 
elaborate concept maps about attitude objects reported attitudes that were more 
predictive of behavioral intentions (Study 1). When the researchers manipulated the 
complexity of the concept maps and whether the concept maps were about the attitude 
object (former substance abusers) or irrelevant topic (the common cold), participants 
that designed more complex, attitude-relevant concept maps showed greater attitude-
behavior consistency (Study 2). By having participants deliberate their knowledge in 
concept maps, Welker and colleagues may have increased the likelihood the 
deliberated knowledge was retrieved during evaluative responses. The researchers 
concluded that when participants were indicating their attitude and later indicating their 
behavioral intentions, those with higher levels of attitude relevant deliberation were 
9 
 
more likely to rely on similar representational inputs, thus making attitudes and 
behavioral intentions more consistent with each other. If this is the case, attitude-
relevant concept mapping may also make attitude reports more consistent across time 
and buffer attitude reports against the widely known context effects that make attitudes 
inconsistent. 
In addition to the amount of deliberation, the source-complexity and behavioral 
relevance of attitude-relevant information has been found to increase attitude-behavior 
consistency. Fabrigar, Smith, Petty, & Crites (2006) found that exposing participants to 
behaviorally-relevant knowledge increased attitude-behavior consistency (Study 1), and 
that the number of knowledge sources improved the attitude-behavior consistency when 
the information was of low-behavioral relevance. In a study of attitude-relevant actions, 
Lin, McIntyre, Welker, and Lord (2011) found that participants that listed both actions 
they have taken toward substance abusers (study 1) and lesbians (study 2) and actions 
members of these social categories have taken toward them (two sources) showed 
greater attitude-behavior consistency than those that listed only their own actions, only 
actions the social category members have taken toward them, or no actions at all (one 
or zero sources). Although both the amount and source complexity of information that 
individuals deliberate is related to attitude-behavior consistency, it has yet to be shown 
empirically, however, that higher amounts of attitude-relevant deliberation lead to 
consistent attitude reports and buffer against sources of attitude change.  
Attitude-Relevant Knowledge and Attitude Construction Stability 
Multiple theories argue that attitudes are constructed by the accessible attitude-
relevant knowledge and mental representations individuals have of attitude objects 
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(Ajzen & Sexton, 1999; Bassili & Brown, 2005; Conrey & Smith, 2007; Fazio, 1990, 
1995, 2007; Ledgerwood, Trope, & Liberman, 2010; Lord & Lepper, 1999). According to 
Attitude Representation Theory (Lord & Lepper, 1999), evaluative responses are a 
function of the subjective assumptions and immediate perceptions of attitude objects. 
When these mental representations match across time, the evaluative responses they 
construct should match as well. Accordingly, Sia et al. (1997) found that when 
participants named the same social category exemplar at two different experimental 
sessions, their attitude reports toward the social category were more consistent across 
the two times (Experiment 1) and their attitudes more accurately predicted behaviors 
(Experiment 2). Thus, if the attitude representations an individual has are strengthened 
in memory, it will be more likely for those representations to be recalled during future 
evaluations. Because these similar representations are activated consistently across 
time, possibly due to accessibility, attitude reports should remain consistent, as well. 
Similarly, Bassili and Brown’s (2005) Potentiated Recruitment Model maintains 
that evaluations are a function of microconcepts activated from a representational 
network. Bassili and Brown identify several sources that activate attitude microconcepts: 
priming, eliciting conditions such as encountering attitude objects, spreading activation, 
and activity in working memory. Attitudes that are stronger and subsequently more 
stable are theorized to be a function of groups of highly interconnected attitude-relevant 
microconcepts (Bassili, 2008). Because these microconcepts are highly interconnected, 
they are very likely to be consistently activated together, leading to the activated attitude 
representations that are relatively consistent across time. In turn, these consistent 
attitude representations will lead to consistent evaluative responses. Conrey & Smith’s 
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(2007) connectionist model of attitude representation and construction makes very 
similar claims to the Potentiated Recruitment Model, but differs in explaining how the 
construction of implicit evaluative responses occurs. Both models view explicit, self-
reported attitudes as a function of the accessible representations in working memory. 
However, Bassili and Brown (2005) argue that implicit evaluations are not a function of 
accessible representations, where Conrey & Smith (2007) posit that individuals are 
conscious of their implicit evaluations, indicating working memory is important for 
implicit evaluations. 
Attitude Change and Social Influence 
According to constructionist view of attitudes, evaluations flexibly adapt to the 
current situation (Schwarz, 2007). Given the limited capacity of human working memory, 
and the vast amounts of attitude-relevant information that are often stored in long-term 
memory, only a small sample of attitude-relevant information is normally used to 
evaluate attitude objects. Because individuals can find themselves in a wide variety of 
unique situations with vastly different demands, they are required to make judgments 
based on widely different samples of evaluative information (Bassili & Brown, 2005; 
Conrey & Smith, 2007; Lord & Lepper, 1999). Even though this variability of evaluation 
can render evaluations inconsistent, less predictive of behavior, and can lead 
researchers to deem the attitude as less-than-useful construct (e.g. Wicker, 1969), the 
flexibility of evaluative responses is advantageous for dealing with the demands of the 
here-and-now. In particular, evaluative flexibility leads individuals to develop needed 
and desired social connections, along with adjust their representation of reality to one 
that is shared by others. 
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Many theorists have argued that humans a fundamental need to seek out and 
maintain affiliations with others (e.g. Baumeister & Leary, 1995; Bowlby, 1969; Horney, 
1945; James, 1890; Leary, 2010; Maslow, 1968). This fundamental need to acquire 
affiliations and avoid rejection (Baumeister & Leary, 1995) has been argued to be 
evolutionary in nature (Ainsworth, 1989; Kameda & Tindale, 2006) and individuals strive 
to behave in specific ways that will be accepted by others (Baumeister & Leary, 1995; 
Leary & Baumeister, 2000). Researchers have found many ways in which individuals 
increase the likelihood of being accepted by others, such as self-disclosure (Miller, 
2002), impression management (Baumeister, 1982; Leary & Kowalski, 1990; Schlenker, 
1980; Jones & Pittman, 1982), and ingratiation (Jones, 1964), among many. To be 
accepted, individuals should also hold attitudes and beliefs that are consistent with 
those who they are to be accepted by (Ledgerwood & Liviatan, 2010). The relational 
strategy of changing one’s attitudes or expression of their attitudes is particularly 
relevant for understanding how evaluations can change in response to social pressures 
and relationship opportunities. 
Socially shared views have been established to be highly important for 
coordinating group behavior (Brennan & Clark, 1996; Festinger, 1950; Hardin & Higgins, 
1996; Turner, 1991; Ledgerwood & Liviatan, 2010; McGuire, 1969). Shared reality 
theory (Echterhoff, Higgins, & Levine, 2009; Hardin & Conley, 2001; Hardin & Higgins, 
1996; Jost, Ledgerwood, & Hardin, 2009) holds that people have both affiliative and 
epistemic motivations to develop a view of the world that is consistent with the views of 
others. Furthermore, according to shared reality theory (SRT), the perception of a 
belief’s veracity is largely determined by whether others’ are viewed as accepting that 
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belief as true. SRT explains a variety of findings revealing the socially-flexible nature of 
judgment, such as why individuals tend to shift their attitudes to be in line with those of 
close relationship partners (Davis & Rusbult, 2001), individuals shift their self-concepts 
and self-evaluations in congruence with those of strangers (Baldwin & Holmes, 1987; 
Hinkley & Anderson, 1996; Sinclair, Dunn, & Lowery, 2005; Sinclair, Lowery, Hardin, & 
Colangelo, 2005), group members’ estimates of the apparent movement of a stationary 
point of light converge over time (Sherif, 1936). SRT also explains how the perceived 
social consensus of racial attitudes affects the distance individuals will sit from members 
of racial outgroups, depending on their own race bias (Sechrist & Stangor, 2001) and 
whether self-evaluations will be affected by the stereotypes of others (Sinclair, 
Huntsinger, Skorinko, & Hardin, 2005), among others. In summary, not only will 
individuals’ evaluations be affected by shifts in their own accessible attitude relevant 
knowledge, their evaluations will be influenced by the evaluations of others and the 
demands of the current situation.  
Concept Mapping 
One technique that has been used extensively to get individuals to think deeply 
about their attitude relevant knowledge is concept mapping. Concept maps, at base, 
diagrams that are used to communicate, represent, and organize knowledge. Designing 
concept maps has been used to as a technique to get individuals to deliberate their 
knowledge and indicate how their knowledge on a given domain is structured (Crandall, 
Klein, & Hoffman, 2006), and a large body of research suggests that concept maps are 
especially effective at leading individuals to retain information (e.g. Amer, 1994; 
Blankenship & Dansereau, 2000; Hall & O’Donnell, 1996; Lambiotte, Dansereau, Cross, 
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& Reynolds, 1989; Nesbit & Adesope, 2005; 2006; Patterson, Dansereau, & Newbern, 
1992; to name very few). In a meta-analysis of 55 concept-mapping studies, Nesbit and 
Adesope (2006) found that concept mapping is a more effective tool for retaining and 
transferring knowledge than reading text passages, attending lectures, participating in 
classroom discussions, and studying lists and outlines. Dansereau and Dees (2002) 
argue that concepts maps are particularly effective at increasing knowledge retention 
because expressing knowledge in sentences can muddle individuals’ understanding of 
presented information with extraneous complexity. Although concept maps cluster 
related ideas, “language tends to ‘string them out’” (Dansereau & Dees, 2002, p. 220). 
Accordingly, graphically presented information is recalled more often than information 
presented by language (Lambiotte, Dansereau, Cross, & Reynolds, 1989; Patterson, 
Dansereau, & Newbern, 1992).  
The applications of concept mapping are numerous. Experts have been asked to 
express their knowledge of given domains in order to facilitate the learning of others, 
such as training new NASA engineers, educating students on the exploration of mars, 
and guiding diagnostic decisions in nuclear cardiology, to name a few (see Crandall, 
Klein, & Hoffman, 2006 for an extensive review). In many scientific journal articles, 
concept maps are also present to effectively communicate and summarize the 
theoretical and statistical relationships among variables (e.g. path diagrams in structural 
equation modeling). Concept mapping has also been established as a tool to lead 
individuals to use their knowledge to solve problems. For example, one line of research 
has found that concept mapping is a successful intervention for reducing substance 
abuse in substance abuse counseling (e.g. Blankenship, Dansereau, & Simpson, 1999; 
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Czuchry & Dansereau, 2003; Czuchry, Newbern-McFarland, & Dansereau, 2009; 
Dansereau & Dees, 2002; Dees & Dansereau, 1993).  
Concept mapping was originally developed and refined as a means of 
understanding changes in students’ scientific knowledge (Novak, 1977; 1998; Novak & 
Gowin, 1984). Novak based the concept mapping activity on the learning theories of 
David Ausubel (1963; 1968).  Ausubel’s learning theory is based on the premise that 
meaningful learning takes place by assimilating new concepts and prepositions with 
pre-existing concepts and prepositions. Thus, concept maps are in part very effective at 
retaining knowledge because they activate known concepts and illustrate their 
relationships with newly learned concepts (Hawk, 1986). In particular, link-node concept 
maps capture this prompting their creators to indicate concepts with nodes, where 
distinct ideas are enclosed in circles or squares, and use lines to connect the 
ideas/nodes. In many examples of concept mapping, individuals also specify how the 
nodes are specifically linked using words and arrows (e.g. [clouds]  create[rain]).  
Though concept maps have been used to evaluate individuals’ knowledge, 
concepts maps can also be used to examine how attitude-relevant knowledge affects 
attitudes. Research using attitude concept mapping (Welker et al., 2012) has already 
demonstrated that creating effective concept maps of attitude-relevant knowledge leads 
to attitude reports that are more predictive of behavioral intentions. One possibility that 
may explain the increased attitude-behavior consistency that attitude-relevant concept 
mapping creates is that attitude-relevant concept mapping increases the consistency in 
evaluations across time. When individuals deliberate their knowledge via concept 
mapping, it increases their retention of the deliberated knowledge, thereby improving 
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their ability to apply the knowledge in future situations (Cañas, Quesada, Antoli, & 
Fajardo, 2003; Mintzes, Wandersee, and Novak, 2000; Novak, 1990; 1991; 1998). 
Therefore, when individuals experience a situation that elicits an evaluation, the 
knowledge that they deliberated by concept mapping is more likely to come to mind, 
leading to consistent evaluations across time. 
Rationale 
Concept maps can effectively aid the deliberation of knowledge, constructing 
evaluations, and taking action. Having individuals deliberate their attitude relevant 
knowledge by building concept maps of the knowledge relevant to an attitude object 
should strengthen the association between their knowledge and the attitude object. 
Thus, when individuals render their evaluations at different times, their evaluations will 
be more consistent if the individuals had created concept maps about the attitude 
object. Furthermore, their evaluations will be less prone to context effects. In the 
present research, it was hypothesized that individuals that deliberate their attitude 
relevant knowledge will report more consistent attitudes across time, even when they 
are at risk of being influenced by other individuals’ reported attitudes. Additionally, 
because attitude strength is related to evaluative consistency, it is important to 
investigate whether attitude strength is both a predictor and a mediator of the effects of 
attitude-relevant deliberation on attitude consistency.  
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CHAPTER 2 
Methods 
Participants and design 
One-hundred and seventy-two university psychology students were randomly 
assigned to a 3 (partner attitude valence: positive, negative, unknown/control) X 2 
(concept map attitude relevance vs. irrelevance) design, with no more than 3 
participants per experimental session. All participants were compensated by receiving 
partial course credit. Of the 172 participants, six participants were removed from the 
analyses due to substantial amounts of missing data in the online pretest, while another 
participant was eliminated for repetitively responding on the online pretest, leaving 165 
participants (45 males, 120 females) included in the analyses. Of the participants, an 
open ended religion question revealed that 47.7% of participants identified as Christian, 
22.1% percent identified as Atheist/Agnostic/Nonreligious, 16.9% identified as Muslim, 
3.5% identified as either being Hindu, Buddhist, Jewish, or Sikh, and another 9.9% did 
not indicate any religion. 
Materials and Procedure 
Online attitude and personality pretest. Prior to the onsite experiment, 
participants completed an online pretest, indicating their attitudes toward physician-
assisted suicide (PAS) and two filler social issues (same-sex marriage and gun control) 
on a 19-point likert-type scale (-9 = very negative, 0 = neutral, +9 = very positive). 
Participants also rated their attitude strength using attitude strength measures similar to 
measures used by other researchers (e.g., Brannon, Tagler, and Eagly, 2006; Krosnick, 
Boninger, Chuang, Berent, & Carnot,  1993;  Pomerantz,  Chaiken,  &  Tordesillas, 
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1995), indicating how strong their attitude toward PAS is, how certain they are of their 
attitude, how confident they are of their attitude, how often they’ve thought of PAS, how 
likely their attitudes are to change, and how personally relevant PAS is to them on 9 - 
point likert scales (see appendix A). Participants will also rate the two filler topics on 
these same strength dimensions.1  
Laboratory experiment. Following the pretest, participants arrived in the 
laboratory to complete what they were informed was a study of how individuals discuss 
their opinions on social issues. Participants were informed by the researcher that after 
completing background questionnaires, the participants would be randomly paired with 
other participants in another location in the laboratory building to have a discussion 
about a selected social policy, a form of anticipated-interaction paradigm (e.g. Chen,  
Schechter, & Chaiken, 1996; Ledgerwood, Trope, & Chaiken, 2010). To minimize 
reactance and ensure participants were not aware of the discussion topic until they 
reported their attitudes, participants were informed that the other laboratory location 
would be selecting the social policy for the discussion topic. 
Concept mapping. The experimenter instructed the participants to design a 
concept map using the cover story that concept mapping was a technique that was 
effective for promoting critical thinking, which was stated to be helpful when engaging in 
in-depth discussions. Participants were informed how to draw a concept map using an 
example concept map about the topic “dogs.” The researcher than gave the participants 
8 minutes to design a concept map either on PAS (the one which they are later 
instructed they will be discussing with their partner) or toward cell phone use while 
driving (not to be discussed with the partner; see Appendix B for an example of a 
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concept map toward the social group, gay men). The topic of cell phone use while 
driving was selected because it was found to have similar attitude and attitude strength 
dimension mean ratings to PAS (Britt, Millard, Sundareswaran, & Moore, 2009), and 
was believed to be unrelated to PAS. While participants created concept maps eight 
minutes, the researcher left and appeared to go to the other laboratory in the building to 
check on the other fictitious participants, acquire paperwork, and find out the discussion 
topic. 
Partner attitude manipulation. After the eight minutes of concept mapping , the 
experimenter returned with several papers that appeared to be from the other lab. The 
manipulation of perceived partner attitudes was similar to that of Ledgerwood, Trope, 
and Chaiken (2010). The participants were told that they would be filling out background 
information about themselves to share with their partner, and that the participant(s) in 
the other lab had completed these same forms. These questionnaires contained several 
questions assessing personal characteristics and demographic information (gender, 
age, year, major, hometown, hobbies, and optional comments). Each participant 
received a blank background sheet and another that appeared to have been completed 
by their fictitious partner (See Appendix C). Participants were seated in cubicles to 
ensure that no participants observed any forms completed by other participants. Every 
participant was paired with what the background sheet described as a 21-year old 3rd 
year psychology major whose hobbies included “hanging out with friends, music, sports, 
reading, and watching television,” but the content of the optional comments entry varied, 
depending on the partner attitude valence condition. In the comments section, the fake 
discussion partner appeared to have either written “I think that physician assisted 
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suicide is a very important issue. I’m actually very much in support of/against physician 
assisted suicide,” or, in the unknown attitude condition, no information appeared in the 
comments section. Once participants finished with the background sheet, the 
researcher gave participants a “pre-interaction questionnaire” with several additional 
measures and left to appear to take the background sheets to the other lab. 
Attitudes and attitude strength. In the pre-interaction question, participants 
rated their attitudes and attitude strength toward PAS using the same measures they 
completed on the pretest (See Appendix D).2  
After completing the dependent measures, participants were probed for suspicion 
using a funnel technique, asked to recall their assigned partners’ attitude, and were 
asked if they felt their attitudes and thoughts toward PAS had changed between the 
online pretest and the experimental session. Of the 57 included participants in the 
negative partner attitude condition and the 52 participants in the positive partner attitude 
condition, all participants in these conditions correctly recalled their assigned partners’ 
attitudes. Finally, participants were debriefed and thanked for their time. Although five of 
the participants suspected the study either involved social influence or attitude 
consistency, none were able to correctly indicate the hypotheses or identify why 
concept mapping was included in the experimental procedure. Although two participants 
indicated that they felt their opinions on PAS changed across the study, removing these 
participants from the analyses did not alter the significance of the subsequent reported 
results.  
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CHAPTER 3 
RESULTS 
Effects of Conditions on Attitudes and Attitude Strength 
To assess whether the experimental conditions affected participants’ attitude 
reports during the experimental sessions, time 2 PAS attitude reports were subjected to 
a 3 (partner attitude: positive, neutral, negative) X 2 (map topic: PAS, cell phone use 
while driving) ANOVA. This analysis yielded no significant main effect of map topic, 
F(1,159) = .13, p = .716, or partner attitude, F(2,159) = 1.52, p = .221, or a map topic X 
partner attitude  interaction, F(2,159) = .05, p = .952, indicating that partner attitude 
condition and the assigned map topic did not affect time 2 attitudes. However, when a 
similar partner attitude X map topic ANCOVA was conducted on time 2 attitudes using 
time 1 (pre-test) attitudes as a covariate, this covariate strongly predicted time 2 
attitudes, F(1,158) = 160.18, p< .001. Controlling for time 1 attitudes, a significant main 
effect of partner attitude was found, F(2,158) = 3.50, p = .032, but again, there was no 
significant main effect of map topic, F(2,158) = .77, p = .383, or map topic X partner 
attitude interaction, F(2, 185) = .30, p = .744. The main effect of partner attitude was 
probed with post-hoc comparisons (Fisher’s LSD, see Figure 1), which revealed that 
although attitudes in the positive partner attitude were significantly greater than attitudes 
in the unknown (p = .034) and negative conditions (p = .018), attitudes in the negative 
and unknown partner attitude conditions did not significantly differ (p = .804). Thus, 
when controlling for time 1 attitudes, only the positive attitude manipulation were 
effective at changing participants’ attitudes. 
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Figure 1.  
 
Adjusted means for experimental session (time 2) attitudes toward physician-assisted 
suicide with error bars representing 95% confidence intervals for adjusted means. 
Numbers above bars represent adjusted means. 
 
Principal components and reliability analyses were conducted six online pretest 
and the six experimental session items assessing attitude strength toward PAS. The 
strength items in the pretest (Cronbach’s α = .72) loaded on one factor that explained 
44.44% of the variance, with absolute loadings ranging from .25 (personal relevance) to 
.91 (certainty and confidence). A second factor explained an additional 24.12% of the 
variance, with large loadings on only three items.  For the experimental session strength 
items (Cronbach’s α = .78), two factors emerged, the first explaining 57.52% of the 
variance (all absolute loadings > .44), and the second explaining 18.47% of the variance 
(3 items with absolute loadings > .26). The factor structure and variance explained of 
the attitude strength components and items are presented in Table 1. Although the 
experimental session strength measures had more admissible reliability and factor 
structure than the online pretest, because the first factor in both forms had adequate 
loadings and explained a substantial amount of the variance and both forms had 
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adequate reliability, the items were averaged for each form to create two overall 
measures of attitude strength for time 1 and time 2. 
Table 1.  
Principal Components Analyses of Attitude Strength Measures 
  Online Pretest 
Experimental 
Session 
Factor 1 2 1 2 
% Variance Explained 44.44% 24.12% 57.52% 18.47% 
 
Factor Loadings (Unrotated) 
 
Online Pretest 
Experimental 
Session 
Perceived strength 0.68 0.08 0.83 -0.14 
Certainty 0.91 -0.14 0.91 -0.23 
Confidence 0.91 -0.15 0.89 -0.17 
Thought Often 0.42 0.71 0.60 0.58 
Likelihood to Change (rev) -0.57 0.50 -0.77 0.26 
Personal Relevance 0.25 0.80 0.44 0.77 
 
Similar to time 2 attitude reports in the previous analyses, a 3 (partner attitude: 
positive, neutral, negative) X 2 (map topic: PAS, cell phone use while driving) ANOVA 
was conducted on the time 2 attitude strength measures, revealing marginally 
significant main effects of partner attitude and map topic, F(2,159) = 2.76, p = .066 and 
F(1,159) = 2.89, p = .091, respectively, and no significant interaction, F(2,159) = 1.56, p 
= .213. When time 1 attitude strength was added as a covariate (which strongly 
predicted time 2 strength, F(1,158) = 161.03, p < .001), the main effect of partner 
attitude remained marginally significant, F(2,158) = 2.73, p = .068, but the main effect of 
map topic and the interaction were not significant, F(1,158) = 1.38, p = .242 and 
F(1,159) = 2.89, p = .091, respectively. To explain the marginal main effect of attitude 
strength, post hoc comparisons (Fisher’s LSD, see Figure 2) of attitude strength 
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adjusted means across the three partner attitude conditions showed that attitude 
strength significantly differed between the positive partner attitude and unknown partner 
attitude conditions (p = .030), marginally differed between the negative and unknown 
partner attitude conditions (p = .078), and did not differ between the negative and 
positive partner attitude conditions (p = .649).  
Figure 2. 
 
Adjusted means for experimental session (time 2) strength of PAS attitudes with error 
bars representing 95% confidence intervals for adjusted means. Numbers above bars 
represent adjusted means. The scale ranged from 1 to 9. 
  
Attitude Consistency, Partner Attitudes, and Map Topic 
The primary hypothesis of the current research was that attitude-relevant concept 
mapping would increase attitude behavior consistency. To test this prediction, 
hierarchical regression analysis was used with time 2 attitudes (A2) regressed on time 1 
attitudes (A1; standardized), map topic (M; dummy coded: 0 = irrelevant, 1 = relevant), 
negative partner attitude (PN; dummy coded: 1 = negative, 0 = otherwise), positive 
partner attitude (Pp; dummy coded: 1 = positive, 0 = otherwise), and all possible 2-way 
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and 3-way interaction cross-products. For the partner attitude dummy variables, the 
unknown attitude condition served as the reference group. In the first step of the 
regression analyses, main effects were entered, followed by 2-way interactions in step 
2, and three way interactions in step 3. The final step of the analyses is represented by 
the following regression equation: 
                                     
                                                            
                                    
 
These analyses yielded no significant two-way or three-way interactions (see Table 2). 
Thus, results from only the first step of the analyses are interpreted and simple slopes 
analyses were not conducted. Attitudes from the online pretest predicted attitudes 
reported during the experimental session very well, β = .70, t(160) = 12.52, p < .001. In 
line with previous analyses, there was also a marginal effect of positive partner attitude, 
β = .13, t(160) = 1.96, p = .052, but no significant effect of negative partner attitude, β = 
-.01, t(160) = -.017, p = .863. Map topic also did not have an effect on time 2 attitudes, β 
= -.04, t(160) = -.65, p = .519. Although the concept map topic was not found to 
moderate the relationship between social influence and attitude change, it is worth 
noting the intercorrelations between attitudes and attitude strength across conditions 
(see Table 2). Altogether, attitudes were very consistent across time, which is indicated 
both in previous analyses with strong prediction of time 2 attitudes by time attitudes and 
correlations among attitude reports in all conditions with rs ≥ .495, all ps < .05. 
Interestingly, the highest correlation between attitudes existed for participants in the 
unknown partner attitude-irrelevant concept mapping conditions (r = .901, p < .001).3  
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Religious Beliefs 
 Given that attitudes toward PAS are predicted by religiosity (Burdette, Hill, & 
Moulton, 2005; McCormack, Clifford, & Conroy, 2012), one topic that could substantially 
influence participant attitudes toward PAS are religious beliefs. A one-way ANOVA was 
conducted on the 3 largest categories of participants’ religions (Christian, Muslim, and 
Atheist/Agnostic/Nonreligious; other categories were excluded from the analyses) on 
time 2 PAS attitudes, revealing significant differences in attitudes toward PAS among 
religious beliefs, F(2,140) = 11.13, p < .001. Post-hoc comparisons  (Fisher’s LSD) 
indicated that nonreligious participants had significantly more positive attitudes toward 
PAS (M = 2.42, SD = .94) than Christians (M = -.95, SD = .60), p = .003, or Muslims (M 
= -4.07, SD = 1.01) that were more negative than Christians (p = .009) and nonreligious 
participants (p <.001). Participants’ religion was used as a predictor in a fourth step of 
the above hierarchical regression analyses predicting time 2 PAS attitudes by time 1 
attitudes, map topic, partner attitude, and all cross-products (contrast coded -1 = 
nonreligious, 0 = Christian, 1 = Muslim). The primary purpose of these analyses were to 
investigate if concept map relevance moderated attitude consistency when controlling 
for religion, which would be indicated if any interaction terms from the previous analyses 
were significant. Although contrast-coded religion was a marginally significant predictor 
of time 2 PAS attitudes, β = -.12, t(131) = -1.78, p = .078, adding this variable to the 
analysis did not change the significance of any interactions, all ps > .486. Alternatively, 
Using a 2 variable dummy code system with Christians as the comparison group 
(Muslim dummy: Muslim = 1, other = 0; Nonreligious dummy: nonreligious = 1, other = 
0) revealed that the Muslim dummy variable was a marginally significant covariate, β = -
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.12, t(130) = -1.91, p = .058, but the nonreligious dummy variable was not, β = .02, 
t(130) = .32, p = .740. Adding these variables as covariates did not result in any 
significant interactions, all ps > .481. Altogether, accounting for the religion of 
participants did not change any of the nonsignificant relationships from the prior 
analyses.4 
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Table 2.  
    Summary of hierarchical regression analysis for variables predicting time 2 
attitudes 
Model Predictor β t p 
Step 1 M -0.04 -0.65 .519 
R2 = .505 Pp 0.13 1.96 .052† 
Δ R2 = .505 Pn -0.01 -0.17 .863 
 F(4,160) = 40.73*** A1 0.70 12.52 < .001*** 
Step 2 M -0.05 -0.49 .624 
R2 = .511 Pp 0.10 1.10 .274 
Δ R2 = .505 Pn 0.00 -0.06 .952 
F(9,155) = 18.01*** A1 0.81 7.32 < .001*** 
 
A1 X M -0.02 -0.22 .829 
 
A1 X Pn -0.10 1.22 .226 
 
A1 X Pp -0.08 -1.09 .278 
 
Pn X M -0.01 -0.12 .909 
  Pp X M 0.04 0.39 .698 
Step 3 M -0.05 -0.49 .624 
R2 = .520 Pp 0.10 1.10 .272 
Δ R2 = .505 Pn 0.00 -0.03 .976 
F(11,153) = 15.06*** A1 0.81 6.01 < .001*** 
 
A1 X M -0.02 -0.12 .903 
 
A1 X Pn -0.04 -0.32 .750 
 
A1 X Pp -0.15 -1.37 .171 
 
Pn X M -0.01 -0.14 .892 
 
Pp X M 0.04 0.39 .697 
 
A1 X M X Pn -0.09 -0.83 .411 
  A1 X M X Pp 0.09 0.85 .396 
 
Note. Results reported are the standardized betas. M = Map Topic (0 = irrelevant, 1 = 
relevant); Pp = Positive Partner Attitude (1 = positive, 0 = otherwise); Pn = Negative 
Partner Attitude (1 = negative, 0 = otherwise); A1 = Time 1 Attitude Report.  
***p < .001 **p < .01 *p < .05 †p < .10 
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Table 3.  
      Summary of Intercorrelations, Means, and Standard Deviations for Attitudes and 
Strength at Time 1 and Time 2 
Negative Partner Attitude       
Measure 1 2 3 4 M SD 
1. ATT1 - -.380 .495* -.527** -0.81 3.03 
2. STR1 .080 - -.438* .557** 5.66 1.52 
3. ATT2 .712** 
 
- -.461* -1.38 5.91 
4. STR2 .043 .712** .036 - 5.13 1.16 
M -1.35 5.62 -0.87 5.27 
 
N = 26 
SD 3.06 1.64 5.94 1.43 N = 31 
 
Unknown Partner Attitude       
Measure 1 2 3 4 M SD 
1. ATT1 - .276 .787** .286 -1.25 3.51 
2. STR1 .046 - .043 .711** 5.57 1.83 
3. ATT2 .901** -.087 - .179 -1.14 5.82 
4. STR2 .125 .774* -.026 - 5.64 1.57 
M -0.89 5.32 -0.61 5.19 
 
N = 28 
SD 3.29 1.46 5.23 1.39 N = 28   
Positive Partner Attitude       
Measure 1 2 3 4 M SD 
1. ATT1 - .198 .718** -.149 -1.00 3.44 
2. STR1 .012 - .057 .777* 5.44 1.65 
3. ATT2 .611** .042 - -.159 0.69 6.10 
4. STR2 .144 .743** .035 - 6.10 1.64 
M -1.35 4.75 0.62 4.38 
 
N = 26 
SD 2.67 1.99 5.17 1.23 N = 26   
Note: Means and standard deviations for the irrelevant mapping conditions appear in 
the lower left and in the upper right for the relevant mapping condition. ATT1 = Time 1 
Attitude Report, ATT2 = Time 2 Attitude Report, STR1 = Time 1 Attitude Strength, 
STR2 = Time 2 Attitude Strength 
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CHAPTER 4 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
 In the present research, participants were led to believe they would interact with 
an individual that were either informed had a negative, positive, or an unknown attitude 
toward PAS. The present research investigated the extent to which concept mapping 
about the topic of PAS or an unrelated topic (cell-phone use while driving) would 
moderate attitude consistency and the influence of attitudes upon attitude consistency. 
In particular, this study was well designed in that it implemented a two-part approach to 
studying attitude consistency, which could assess changes in attitude strength and 
attitude valence across time. Although previous research has examined how concept 
mapping affects attitude-behavioral intention consistency (Welker et al., 2012), this 
study was the first to examine how concept mapping affects attitude consistency with a 
two-part design.  
 Although all participants believed they would meet with another participant (albeit 
with some minor suspicions) and were effortful in constructing their maps, the social 
influence manipulation was only successful in changing attitudes when participants 
were exposed to partners that held positive attitudes, only when controlling for time 1 
attitudes, whereas the partner with negative attitude manipulation did not successfully 
affect attitude valence in comparison to the unknown attitude control groups. However, 
exposing participants to others’ attitudes, whether positive or negative, reduced attitude 
strength. Moreover, although the social influence manipulation was not entirely 
successful at changing attitude valence, it did affect attitude strength. Contrary to 
hypotheses, the concept map relevance did not moderate the effects of partner attitude 
31 
 
influence on attitude valence consistency. Although the attitude consistency of the 
irrelevant-neutral group was not significantly different from other experimental groups, 
this group yielded the highest attitude consistency, when it was hypothesized this group 
would have the lowest attitude consistency. 
Limitations 
The high attitude consistency in PAS attitudes, which was not found to be 
moderated by concept mapping or social influence, may be explained by the attitude 
object that was chosen. Physician assisted suicide, despite being a topic that individuals 
have, on average, moderate levels of attitude strength and valence toward (Britt et a., 
2009), may be a topic that individuals are unlikely to change perspectives on, 
particularly due to religiosity (Meier, Emmons, Wallenstein, Quill, Morrison, & Cassel, 
1998). Even though this study did not assess religiosity per se, controlling for 
participants’ religion did alter any of the observed relationships between attitudes, 
concept mapping, and social influence. Although the religion of participants was used as 
a predictor, if measures relevant to religiosity and attitudes were included in the study 
and controlled for, such as religiosity, right wing authoritarianism (Altemeyer, 1988), or 
dogmatism (Rokeach, 1960), moderation effects of concept mapping and social 
influence may have occurred on attitude consistency. Right wing authoritarianism and 
religious dogmatism are both associated with religious fundamentalism (Altemeyer & 
Hunsberger, 2004). In turn, conservative Christians are more likely to hold negative 
attitudes toward PAS in comparison to other religious groups (Burdette et al, 2005).  
 It is also possible, that the main attitude topic, PAS, may have increased 
participants thinking about death and or dying. The map topic of PAS, in comparison to 
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cell phone use while driving, may also have primed some individuals to think of death. 
Research from the perspective of terror management theory (Greenberg, Pyszczynski, 
& Solomon, 1986; Greenberg, Solomon, & Arndt, 2008; Pyszczynski, Greenberg, Koole, 
& Solomon, 2010) has examined the extent to which death-related thoughts impact a 
wide range of human behaviors, including attitudes toward outgroups (Greenberg et al., 
1990), self-esteem (Schmeichel, Gailliot, Filardo, McGregor, Gitter, & Baumeister, 
2009), defense of personal worldviews (Solomon, Greenberg, & Pyszczynski, 2004), to 
name very few. Research on social attitudes and norm adherence in the face of the 
awareness of death has shown mortality salience leads individuals to recommend more 
negative punishments for individuals that violate social norms (Rosenblatt, Greenberg, 
Solomon, Pysczynski, & Lyon, 1989, studies 1, 2, and 6) and greater rewards for heroes 
that uphold cultural values (Rosenblatt, Greenberg, Solomon, Pysczynski, & Lyon, 
1989, study 3), for example. Additionally, Greenberg and colleagues (1990) also found 
that mortality salience leads individuals to evaluate religious ingroup members more 
positively than outgroup members (study 1), and in high-authoritarianism individuals, 
negative attitudes toward individuals with different attitudes (study 2), along with positive 
reactions to individuals that praise ones’ cultural worldview (study 3).Mortality salience 
also leads individuals to avoid potentially damaging a cultural icon to solve a problem 
(Greenberg, Porteus, Simon, Pyszczynski, & Solomon, 1995). Given that negative 
attitudes toward PAS have been linked to conservative political beliefs and religiosity 
(Burdette et al, 2005; McCormack et al, 2012), both characteristics of traditional world 
views, and that thinking about PAS is likely to result in mortality salience, investigating 
mortality salience in the context of PAS attitudes is essential. Because mortality 
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salience influences individuals to cherish their personal worldview and eschew ideas 
that violate their conventions, individuals may be less likely to be influenced by the 
attitudes of others toward PAS. Because of this individuals may have found partners 
that disclosed attitudes toward PAS that differed from their own to be less persuasive.  
 Although Terror Management Theory may be an explanation for why the social 
influence manipulations did not work well in this study, TMT does not fully explain the 
results, nor was TMT systematically tested.  In the present research, individuals that 
created irrelevant concept maps without being exposed to social influence had the 
greatest attitude behavior consistency of all conditions. Since participants in the relevant 
concept conditions deliberated about PAS more than the irrelevant concept map 
participants, it would still be expected that participants in the relevant mapping 
conditions would have the greatest attitude consistency. Although mortality salience 
may have affected the susceptibility to attitude change and deliberation in some, 
participants in the irrelevant concept mapping conditions showed the highest attitude 
consistency in the present research, indicating that other factors may be at work against 
this mortality salience hypothesis.  
 Previous research using social groups as attitude objects has found that concept 
mapping is effective in improving evaluative consistency (Welker et al., 2012). This 
research, along with the current research, was derived from the contention that concept 
maps are effective for knowledge deliberation because they enable individuals to 
integrate many concepts within their existing knowledge (Novak, 1977; 1998; Novak & 
Gowin, 1984), a process fundamental to meaningful learning (Ausubel, 1963; 1968). 
However, this process of integration may be more difficult for certain attitude objects. 
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For instance, the use of social groups (e.g. homeless people) for attitude concept 
mapping because individuals may find it easy to link up a wide range of representations 
of homeless individuals, such as characteristics, actions, exemplars, experiences, or 
situations. However, many college students may have had little experience or exposure 
to the topic of PAS, leading them to find it more difficult to integrate with their 
knowledge. This may have lead the concept mapping activities to be less effective at 
getting individuals to effectively deliberate their attitude-relevant knowledge and have it 
impact the consistency of their explicit attitude reports. 
 Another limitation of the current study involves a limited time-frame in which to 
observe changes in attitudes. Researchers of concept mapping have described concept 
mapping as a way of inducing new, long lasting changes in conceptualizations (Novak, 
2002). Although it was hypothesized that concept mapping would lead to stronger 
attitude consistency, this was not supported by the results of this study. However, this 
lack of results does not necessarily imply that concept mapping leads individuals to be 
more consistent. Although nonsignificant, with the exception of the positive attitude 
influence conditions, individuals in the relevant mapping conditions actually had lower 
attitude consistency correlations than those in the irrelevant concept mapping 
conditions. The attitude consistency concept mapping creates may actually be a more 
delayed process, where concept mapping alters how an individual thinks about a topic, 
but in turn makes their attitudes more consistent across time. This interpretation is 
consistent with research on concept mapping, which shows that concept maps can lead 
individuals to new insights on the content they map about (e.g. Blankenship & 
Dansereau, 2000; Dansereau & Dees, 2002; Novak, 1990, 1998; Novak & Gowin, 
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1984). In particular, concept mapping may lead to attitude consistency, but only after 
individuals have created concept maps.  
Future directions for research 
 Future research on concept mapping and attitudes would benefit to investigate 
longer term effects of concept mapping on attitudes. Ideally, a longitudinal study could 
assess attitudes at different points in time, with a concept mapping treatment at the 
beginning of the second part of the study. With this type of design, the extent to which 
concept maps induce attitude consistency or change can be measured before and after 
concept mapping, along with attitude consistency effects in post-intervention measures.  
Taking into account the limitations identified within the current research, it will 
also be important to assess all potential variables that could influence participants’ 
attitudes or reactions to persuasion with respect to the attitude object. In the current 
research, authoritarianism, religious variables, and death-thought accessibility could 
foreseeably affect attitudes and attitude consistency toward PAS. Future research on 
PAS attitudes would benefit from the inclusion of these variables. Similarly, for other 
specific attitude objects, other important variables may be necessary to take into 
consideration. For instance, if researchers investigating attitude concept mapping 
toward the topic of environmentalism, it may be important to take into account variables 
such as participants’ knowledge of environmental science, the extent to which 
participants view global warming as a threat, and whether participants believe human 
beings are responsible for global warming. Additionally, because the extent to which 
participants’ existing knowledge can be integrated within their concept maps will vary as 
a function of the map topic, researchers would also do well to select concept map topics 
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that participants have extensive knowledge about or have a large amount of knowledge 
that can be connected to the topic. 
Conclusion 
Although the current research did not find that concept mapping affected attitude 
consistency, several limitations may have altered these effects. Despite this lack of 
findings, investigating the relationships between attitude strength and attitude 
consistency with the extent to which individuals think about attitude objects is an 
important venture within social psychology. Although numerous studies have already 
investigated attitude relevant thinking and the properties of attitudes, none have focused 
as much on the extent to which individuals deliberate knowledge and how well they 
integrate the attitude object with their personal knowledge. Using concept mapping to 
study attitudes allows for both of these characteristics of knowledge to be assessed.  
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FOOTNOTES 
1The effectiveness the manipulations in experimental laboratory session on 
attitudes might vary, depending on individual differences. To account for these 
possibilities, participants completed several personality and individual difference 
measures. These measures included the Need for Cognition Scale (Cacioppo & Petty, 
1982), Need for closure scale (Webster & Kruglanski, 1994), Self-Monitoring scale 
(Snyder, 1974), and the Big-5 ten-item personality inventory (Gosling, Rentfrow, & 
Swann, 2003). See Appendix A for the attitude, attitude strength, and personality 
scales. 
2Because the effectiveness of the concept mapping activity or partner attitude 
manipulation could have influenced or have been influenced by several additional 
factors, participants completed several additional measures (See Appendix D), including 
a mood item (“In general, how do you feel right now?”), an item assessing their interest 
in PAS (“How interesting do you think the issue of physician-assisted suicide is?”), 
affiliation motivation (DeWall, Visser, Leviatan, 2006), and several items examining the 
interaction they expect to have with their partner.  
3The number of nodes all participants listed on their concept maps were also 
measured. A 2 (Map topic: PAS, cell phone use) X 3 (Partner attitude: positive, 
unknown, negative) ANOVA revealed a main effect of map topic, F(1, 159) = 4.14, p = 
.043. Participants that created maps about cell phone use listed more map nodes (M = 
21.66, SD = 7.69) than those that created maps about PAS (M = 19.33, SD = 7.07), 
which is likely due to the fact that college students have more knowledge of the topic of 
using cell phones while driving than physician assisted suicide, and can thus create 
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more extensive concept maps about the topic. There was no significant main effect of 
partner attitude, F(2,159) = .13, p = .879, or partner attitude X topic interaction, F(2,159) 
= 1.06, p = .349. Correlation analyses were used to assess if nodes were related to time 
1 and time 2 attitudes, attitude strength, and also the absolute value difference of time 1 
and time 2 attitudes (a proxy of attitude consistency) within all 6 experimental conditions 
and the sample as a whole. Within each experimental condition, none of these five 
variables were found to be significantly correlated with the number of nodes (ps ≥ .065). 
Within all participants that created PAS maps (N = 80), node number was not 
significantly related to any of above variables (all ps ≥ 561). Interestingly, however, in 
the irrelevant map condition (N = 85), the number of nodes was related to PAS attitudes 
for time 1 (r(83) = .22, p = .040) and time 2 (r(83) = .31, p = .004 ; all other ps ≥ .581), 
indicating that individuals that think more in depth about cell phone use while driving 
have more positive attitudes toward PAS. However, altogether, the number of nodes 
participants indicated on relevant attitude maps was not substantially related to 
participants’ attitudes, attitude strength, or attitude consistency. 
4Religion (dummy coded) did not interact with the experimental conditions to 
affect attitudes, all ps > .180. However, it is important to note that the cell counts 
between religion (3 levels), map topic (2 levels), and partner attitude condition (2 levels) 
were low in number and uneven (ranging from N = 3 to N = 17), indicating that they 
were unlikely to yield significant differences using Analysis of Variance. 
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APPENDIX A 
Online Questionnaire 
 
Please answer all of the following questions using the scales below and put your 
answer in the blank space. 
Please answer these questions about the chosen topic:  
 
 
 
What is your attitude toward physician-assisted suicide?   
-9  -8  -7  -6   -5  -4  -3  -2  -1   0   1   2   3   4   5   6   7   8   9 
extremely                        neutral                          extremely 
negative                                                                     positive  
How strong is your attitude toward physician-assisted suicide?  
1          2          3          4          5          6          7          8          9 
Not very                                                                          very 
strong at all                                                                         strong  
How certain are you about attitude toward physician-assisted suicide?   
1          2          3          4          5          6          7          8          9 
Not very                                                                          very 
certain at all                                                                         certain  
How confident are you about your attitude toward physician-assisted 
suicide?   
1          2          3          4          5          6          7          8          9 
Not very                                                                          very 
confident at all                                                                   confident  
How often have you thought about physician-assisted suicide before 
today?   
1          2          3          4          5          6          7          8          9 
Not at all                                                                 Quite a bit 
                                                                     
How likely is your attitude toward physician-assisted suicide to 
change?   
1          2          3          4          5          6          7          8          9 
very                                                                                   very 
unlikely                                                                               likely   
How personally relevant is physician-assisted suicide to you?  
1          2          3          4          5          6          7          8          9 
Not very                                                                        very 
Relevant at all                                                               relevant  
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What is your attitude toward same-sex marriage?   
-9  -8  -7  -6   -5  -4  -3  -2  -1   0   1   2   3   4   5   6   7   8   9 
extremely                        neutral                          extremely 
negative                                                                     positive  
How strong is your attitude toward same-sex marriage?  
1          2          3          4          5          6          7          8          9 
Not very                                                                          very 
strong at all                                                                         strong  
How certain are you about attitude toward same-sex marriage?   
1          2          3          4          5          6          7          8          9 
Not very                                                                          very 
certain at all                                                                         certain  
How confident are you about your attitude toward same-sex 
marriage?   
1          2          3          4          5          6          7          8          9 
Not very                                                                          very 
confident at all                                                                   confident  
How often have you thought about same-sex marriage before today?   
1          2          3          4          5          6          7          8          9 
Not at all                                                                 Quite a bit 
                                                                     
How likely is your attitude toward same-sex marriage to change?   
1          2          3          4          5          6          7          8          9 
very                                                                                   very 
unlikely                                                                               likely   
How personally relevant is same-sex marriage to you?  
1          2          3          4          5          6          7          8          9 
Not very                                                                        very 
Relevant at all                                                               relevant  
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What is your attitude toward gun control?   
-9  -8  -7  -6   -5  -4  -3  -2  -1   0   1   2   3   4   5   6   7   8   9 
extremely                        neutral                          extremely 
negative                                                                     positive  
How strong is your attitude toward gun control?  
1          2          3          4          5          6          7          8          9 
Not very                                                                          very 
strong at all                                                                         strong  
How certain are you about attitude toward gun control?   
1          2          3          4          5          6          7          8          9 
Not very                                                                          very 
certain at all                                                                         certain  
How confident are you about your attitude toward gun control?   
1          2          3          4          5          6          7          8          9 
Not very                                                                          very 
confident at all                                                                   confident  
How often have you thought about gun control before today?   
1          2          3          4          5          6          7          8          9 
Not at all                                                                 Quite a bit 
                                                                     
How likely is your attitude toward gun control to change?   
1          2          3          4          5          6          7          8          9 
very                                                                                   very 
unlikely                                                                               likely   
How personally relevant is gun control to you?  
1          2          3          4          5          6          7          8          9 
Not very                                                                        very 
Relevant at all                                                               relevant  
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Need for cognition scale 
 
Rate each item on the following scale: 
 
             -4            -3            -2            -1            0             1             2             3             4   
Strongly Disagree                                                                                             Strongly 
Agree 
 
 
1. I really enjoy a task that involves coming up with new solutions to 
problems. 
 
_______ 
2. I appreciate opportunities to discover the strengths and weaknesses 
of my own reasoning. 
 
_______ 
3. I would prefer my life to be filled with puzzles that I must solve. 
 
_______ 
4. I enjoy thinking about an issue even when the results of my thought 
will have no effect on the outcome of the issue. 
 
_______ 
5. I tend to set goals that can be accomplished only by expending 
considerable mental effort. 
 
_______ 
6. I am usually tempted to put more thought into a task than the job 
minimally requires. 
 
_______ 
7. I appreciate opportunities to discover the strengths and weaknesses 
of my own reasoning. 
 
_______ 
8. I usually end up deliberating about issues even when they do not 
affect me personally. 
 
_______ 
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Need for closure scale 
 
Rate each item on the following scale: 
 
             -4            -3            -2            -1            0             1             2             3             4   
Strongly Disagree                                                                                             Strongly 
Agree 
 
 
1. When faced with a problem, I usually see the one best solution very 
quickly. 
 
_______ 
2. I do not usually consult many different options before forming my 
own view. 
 
_______ 
3. I tend to streuggle with most decisions. 
 
_______ 
4. When considering most conflict situations, I can usually see how both 
sides could be right. 
 
_______ 
5. When thinking about a problem, I consider as many different opinions 
on the issue as possible. 
 
_______ 
6. Even after I’ve made up my mind about something, I am always 
eager to consider a different opinion. 
 
_______ 
7. I always see many possible solutions to problems I face. 
 
_______ 
8. When trying to solve a problem, I often see so many possible options 
that it’s confusing. 
 
_______ 
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Ten-Item Personality Inventory-(TIPI) 
 
Here are a number of personality traits that may or may not apply to you.  Please write a 
number next to each statement to indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with 
that statement. You should rate the extent to which the pair of traits applies to you, even if 
one characteristic applies more strongly than the other.  
 
 
Disagree Disagree Disagree         Neither agree    Agree           Agree      Agree 
strongly   moderately    a little           nor disagree    a little              moderately          strongly 
 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
 
I see myself as: 
 
1.  _____  Extraverted, enthusiastic. 
 
2.  _____  Critical, quarrelsome. 
 
3.  _____  Dependable, self-disciplined. 
 
4.  _____  Anxious, easily upset. 
 
5.  _____  Open to new experiences, complex. 
 
6.  _____  Reserved, quiet. 
 
7.  _____  Sympathetic, warm. 
 
8.  _____  Disorganized, careless. 
 
9.   _____  Calm, emotionally stable. 
 
10. _____  Conventional, uncreative.  
 
 
Gosling, S. D., Rentfrow, P. J., & Swann, W. B., Jr. (2003). A very brief measure of the 
Big-Five personality domains. Journal of Research in Personality, 37, 504-528. 
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Self-Monitoring Scale 
 
The statements below concern your personal reactions to a number of different 
situations. No two statements are exactly alike, so consider each statement carefully 
before answering. IF a statement is TRUE or MOSTLY TRUE as applied to you, circle 
the "T" next to the question. If a statement is FALSE or NOT USUALLY TRUE as 
applied to you, circle the "F" next to the question. 
 
(T) (F) 1. I find it hard to imitate the behavior of other people.  
(T) (F) 2. My behavior is usually an expression of my true inner feelings, attitudes, and 
beliefs.  
(T) (F) 3. At parties and social gatherings, I do not attempt to do or say things that 
others will like.  
(T) (F) 4. I can only argue for ideas which I already believe.  
(T) (F) 5. I can make impromptu speeches even on topics about which I have almost no 
information.  
(T) (F) 6. I guess I put on a show to impress or entertain people.  
(T) (F) 7. When I am uncertain how to act in a social situation, I look to the behavior of 
others for cues.  
(T) (F) 8. I would probably make a good actor.  
(T) (F) 9. I rarely seek the advice of my friends to choose movies, books, or music.  
(T) (F) 10. I sometimes appear to others to be experiencing deeper emotions than I 
actually am.  
(T) (F) 11. I laugh more when I watch a comedy with others than when alone.  
(T) (F) 12. In groups of people, I am rarely the center of attention.  
(T) (F) 13. In different situations and with different people, I often act like very different 
persons.  
(T) (F) 14. I am not particularly good at making other people like me.  
(T) (F) 15. Even if I am not enjoying myself, I often pretend to be having a good time.  
(T) (F) 16. I'm not always the person I appear to be.  
(T) (F) 17. I would not change my opinions (or the way I do things) in order to please 
someone else or win their favor.  
(T) (F) 18. I have considered being an entertainer.  
(T) (F) 19. In order to get along and be liked, I tend to be what people expect me to be 
rather than anything else.  
(T) (F) 20. I have never been good at games like charades or improvisational acting.  
(T) (F) 21. I have trouble changing my behavior to suit different people and different 
situations.  
(T) (F) 22. At a party, I let others keep the jokes and stories going.  
(T) (F) 23. I feel a bit awkward in company and do not show up quite as well as I should.  
(T) (F) 24. I can look anyone in the eye and tell a lie with a straight face (if for a right 
end).  
(T) (F) 25. I may deceive people by being friendly when I really dislike them. 
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APPENDIX B 
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APPENDIX C 
 
Gender: _____Male/Female_______ 
 
Age: ______21_____ 
 
 
 
Year in school (please circle):      Freshmen Sophomore  Junior  Senior 
 
 
 
Major: ____________________Psychology________________ 
 
 
 
Hometown: ________________Detroit____________________ 
 
 
 
Hobbies:  
 
Hanging out with friends, Music, Sports, Reading, Watching television _____________ 
 
______________________________________________________________________ 
 
______________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
Comments (optional): 
 
______“I think that physician assisted suicide is a very important issue. I’m actually very  
 
much in support/against physician assisted suicide.” ____________________________ 
 
______________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
*This text on this sheet was hand-written when used in the experiment. 
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APPENDIX D 
 
Please answer all of the following questions using the scales below and put your 
answer in the blank space. 
Please answer these questions about the chosen topic:  
 
 
What is your attitude toward physician-assisted suicide?   
-9  -8  -7  -6   -5  -4  -3  -2  -1   0   1   2   3   4   5   6   7   8   9 
extremely                        neutral                          extremely 
negative                                                                     positive  
How strong is your attitude toward physician-assisted suicide?  
1          2          3          4          5          6          7          8          9 
Not very                                                                          very 
strong at all                                                                         strong  
How certain are you about attitude toward physician-assisted suicide?   
1          2          3          4          5          6          7          8          9 
Not very                                                                          very 
certain at all                                                                         certain  
How confident are you about your attitude toward physician-assisted 
suicide?   
1          2          3          4          5          6          7          8          9 
Not very                                                                          very 
confident at all                                                                   confident  
How often have you thought about physician-assisted suicide before 
today?   
1          2          3          4          5          6          7          8          9 
Not at all                                                                 Quite a bit 
                                                                     
How likely is your attitude toward physician-assisted suicide to 
change?   
1          2          3          4          5          6          7          8          9 
very                                                                                   very 
unlikely                                                                               likely   
How personally relevant is physician-assisted suicide to you?  
1          2          3          4          5          6          7          8          9 
Not very                                                                        very 
Relevant at all                                                               relevant  
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What is your attitude toward same-sex marriage?   
-9  -8  -7  -6   -5  -4  -3  -2  -1   0   1   2   3   4   5   6   7   8   9 
extremely                        neutral                          extremely 
negative                                                                     positive  
How strong is your attitude toward same-sex marriage?  
1          2          3          4          5          6          7          8          9 
Not very                                                                          very 
strong at all                                                                         strong  
How certain are you about attitude toward same-sex marriage?   
1          2          3          4          5          6          7          8          9 
Not very                                                                          very 
certain at all                                                                         certain  
How confident are you about your attitude toward same-sex 
marriage?   
1          2          3          4          5          6          7          8          9 
Not very                                                                          very 
confident at all                                                                   confident  
How often have you thought about same-sex marriage before today?   
1          2          3          4          5          6          7          8          9 
Not at all                                                                 Quite a bit 
                                                                     
How likely is your attitude toward same-sex marriage to change?   
1          2          3          4          5          6          7          8          9 
very                                                                                   very 
unlikely                                                                               likely   
How personally relevant is same-sex marriage to you?  
1          2          3          4          5          6          7          8          9 
Not very                                                                        very 
Relevant at all                                                               relevant  
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What is your attitude toward gun control?   
-9  -8  -7  -6   -5  -4  -3  -2  -1   0   1   2   3   4   5   6   7   8   9 
extremely                        neutral                          extremely 
negative                                                                     positive  
How strong is your attitude toward gun control?  
1          2          3          4          5          6          7          8          9 
Not very                                                                          very 
strong at all                                                                         strong  
How certain are you about attitude toward gun control?   
1          2          3          4          5          6          7          8          9 
Not very                                                                          very 
certain at all                                                                         certain  
How confident are you about your attitude toward gun control?   
1          2          3          4          5          6          7          8          9 
Not very                                                                          very 
confident at all                                                                   confident  
How often have you thought about gun control before today?   
1          2          3          4          5          6          7          8          9 
Not at all                                                                 Quite a bit 
                                                                     
How likely is your attitude toward gun control to change?   
1          2          3          4          5          6          7          8          9 
very                                                                                   very 
unlikely                                                                               likely   
How personally relevant is gun control to you?  
1          2          3          4          5          6          7          8          9 
Not very                                                                        very 
Relevant at all                                                               relevant  
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Mood scale 
(Ledgerwood et al., 2010) 
 
In general, how do you feel right now? (Please Circle) 
 
             -4            -3            -2            -1            0             1             2             3             4   
 
Very Negative                                                                                                Very Positive 
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Social Issue Interest 
 
How interesting do you find the topic of physician-assisted suicide to be? 
 
             -4            -3            -2            -1            0             1             2             3             4   
  
       Not very                                                                                                            Very 
     Interesting                    Interesting 
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Social preferences scale 
(DeWall, Visser, Levitan, 2006) 
 
Rate each item on the following scale: 
 
             -4            -3            -2            -1            0             1             2             3             4   
Strongly Disagree                                                                                             Strongly 
Agree 
 
1. There’s nothing wrong with going along with what others say in order 
to get along with them. 
 
_______ 
2. I think it is desirable to go along with the opinions of others when 
confronted with a controversial issue. 
 
_______ 
3. I think it is usually better not to point out a weakness in another 
person’s argument, even if I am good friends with that person.  
 
_______ 
4. Although I may enjoy the value of a good argument, it is sometimes 
more important to be a good listener. 
_______ 
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Interaction Expectations Scale 
 
Rate each item on the following scale: 
Disagree 
strongly 
Disagree 
moderately 
Disagree 
a little 
Neither 
agree nor 
disagree 
Agree a 
little 
Agree 
moderately 
Agree 
strongly 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
 
1. Given their description on the background sheet, I 
expect to get along with my partner. 
 
 
_______ 
2. I plan on having a debate during the upcoming 
discussion. 
 
 
_______ 
3. I’m looking forward to the discussion with my 
partner. 
 
 
_______ 
4. My partner’s views could influence the way I think 
about our discussion topic. 
 
 
_______ 
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Attitude relevant knowledge is a central component to evaluative consistency and 
attitude representation. One way to assess the degree to which individuals deliberate 
and represent their knowledge is through concept mapping. Therefore, the present 
research investigated whether concept map deliberation moderated attitude consistency 
in a two-part experiment. Participants (N = 172) completed an online survey assessing 
personality, attitudes, and attitude strength toward physician assisted suicide (PAS). In 
a second onsite sessions participants were randomly assigned create an attitude-
relevant or attitude-irrelevant concept map, and were randomly assigned to work with a 
fictitious partner who had a positive, negative, or unknown attitude toward PAS, which 
served as a source of social influence. Participants again reported attitudes and attitude 
strength. Results indicated that concept map relevance did not moderate PAS attitude 
consistency. Possible reasons for the null findings and future directions for research are 
explored. 
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